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Abstract 
 
Live bird market surveillance for avian influenza viruses in Cambodia in 2015 has led 
to the detection of two 7:1 reassortant influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.2.1c viruses. 
These reassortant strains, designated A/duck/Cambodia/Z564W35M1/2015 and 
A/chicken/Cambodia/Z850W49M1/2015, both contained a single gene (PB1 and 
matrix gene, respectively) from concurrently circulating A(H9N2) influenza viruses. 
All other viral genes from both isolates clustered with A(H5N1) clade 2.3.2.1 viruses. 
Continued and prolonged co-circulation of influenza A(H5N1) and A(H9N2) viruses in 
Cambodian live bird markets may present a risk for the emergence of novel influenza 
reassortant viruses with negative agricultural and/or public health implications. 
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Introduction 
 
Live bird markets (LBMs) in Asia are a critical factor in the persistence of avian 
influenza viruses in the region and the probable source of many reassortant viruses 
[1]. The presence of multiple avian species, insufficient biosecurity measures and 
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constant introduction of immunologically naïve animals all contribute to the 
heightened risk for the emergence of influenza viruses with pandemic potential. 
While influenza hemagglutinin subtypes A(H5) and A(H7) are classically considered 
to have high pandemic potential, several other influenza subtypes including 
A(H6N1), A(H10N8) and A(H9N2) have crossed the species barrier into humans [2]; 
and many other avian influenza viruses currently circulate in Asian poultry 
populations with the potential for adverse animal or human health impacts. 
 
 
In Cambodia, AIV surveillance in poultry focuses on passive detection of AIVs in 
reportedly ill animals and active surveillance at LBMs. Cambodian LBMs 
predominantly sell live chickens and ducks to consumers supplied from backyard 
flocks. Surveillance for AIVs at the rural farming level is not currently performed. 
Biosecurity measures at farms and LBMs are either minimal or non-existent. For 
instance, species separation during the rearing and trading process is not typical and 
vaccination of poultry against AIVs is illegal. At LBMs overnight bans on holding 
poultry are in place and veterinary officers that are in charge of each LBM ensure 
visibly ill poultry are not being traded. Previous studies have shown high levels of 
AIV prevalence, diversity and AIV subtype co-infections in Cambodian LBMs [1, 3, 
4]. In this report we characterize two reassortant A(H5N1) viruses detected during 
AIV surveillance performed at LBMs in 2015. 
 
 
Materials and methods 
 
Active surveillance at Cambodian LBMs in 2015 was coordinated by the Institute 
Pasteur in Cambodia (IPC, WHO National Influenza Centre and H5 Reference 
Laboratory) and the National Animal Health and Production Research Institute 
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(NAHPRI, from General Directorate for Animal Health and Production, Cambodian 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries). The sample collection strategy has 
been described previously [1]. Briefly, environmental and poultry samples were 
collected weekly from LBMs in Phnom Penh (the capital city of Cambodia) and 
surrounding areas. Pooled oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs were collected from 
individual chickens and ducks, randomly selected from each LBM. 
 
 
Samples were processed according to previously established methods and screened 
for the presence of influenza A viruses by real-time RT-PCR detection of the matrix 
protein (MP) gene [1, 3, 4]. Samples that were positive for influenza A virus were 
further tested for A(H5N1) and other avian influenza viruses of concern (namely H7 
and H9) using real-time RT-PCR to detect H5 (primer sets H5a and H5b), N1, H7, 
and H9 genes. All assays were sourced from the International Reagent Resource 
(https://www.internationalreagentresource.org/Home.aspx). 
 
 
To better understand the circulating subtypes in Cambodia, IPC routinely generates 
full genome avian influenza virus sequences from virus isolates cultured in 
embryonated eggs, using previously described methods [4, 5]. Briefly, full genome 
sequences were obtained using the Ion Torrent™ Next Generation Sequencing 
(NGS) platform at the WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on 
Influenza in Melbourne, Australia. Quality control and assembly of NGS data was 
performed using CLC Genomics Workbench (version 10). Any gaps in NGS 
sequences were filled using Sanger sequencing. Segment specific primers were 
used to amplify products that were then sequenced directly with BigDye Terminator 
v3.1 chemistry using a Genetic Analyzer 3500xL sequencing machine (Life 
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Technologies). Phylogenetic trees were constructed using the maximum likelihood 
method based on the general time-reversible model with gamma distribution in 
RAxML [6]. Bootstrap values were calculated and expressed as a percentage from 
1,000 replicates. The GenBank accession numbers for Cambodian strains included 
in the phylogenetic analysis are: MH285274 - MH285329. 
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
During the course of isolation and sequencing, we detected two clade 2.3.2.1 
influenza A(H5N1) 7:1 reassortant viruses from Cambodian LBM surveillance 
activities in 2015 that contained single genes from A(H9N2) viruses [1]. These 
viruses, designated A/duck/Cambodia/Z564W35M1/2015 and 
A/chicken/Cambodia/Z850W49M1/2015, were originally detected by H5 RT-qPCR 
from swab material and were subsequently isolated in embyronated chicken eggs. 
Sequence analysis of the resulting isolates revealed that the viruses arose from two 
separate reassortment events. The first virus (A/duck/Cambodia/Z564W35M1/2015) 
was isolated from a duck sample collected in August 2015 and obtained its PB1 
gene from A(H9N2). The second virus (A/chicken/Cambodia/Z850W49M1/2015) was 
isolated from a chicken sample collected in November 2015 and contained a MP 
gene from an A(H9N2) virus. All other genes from both reassortant viruses originated 
from influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.2.1 (Figure 1/Supplementary Figure 1). Coinfection 
between A(H5N1) and A(H9N2) in the egg isolates and original samples was ruled 
out by confirming the absence of an H9 HA gene via PCR analysis. 
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Fig. 1. Phylogenetic analysis of HA, NA, PB1 and MP genomic segments of the 
Cambodian A(H5N1) reassortant viruses. Trees were constructed using 
the maximum likelihood method based on the general time-reversible model 
with gamma distribution. Branches of H5 and N1 genes trees are presented in 
red. Branches of H9 and N2 genes trees are presented in blue. Branches of PB1 
and MP genes are colour coded based on the subtype of HA genes, A(H5) 
viruses are red and A(H9) viruses are blue. The taxa of both Cambodian 
A(H5N1) reassortant strains (A/duck/Cambodia/Z564W35M1/2015 and 
A/chicken/Cambodia/Z850W49M1/2015) have been highlighted in red. Scale 
bars indicate the number of substitutions per site and bootstrap values 
(n = 1000) of 70 or greater are shown. 
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The replacement of the A(H5N1) MP gene with that from A(H9N2) in strain 
A/chicken/Cambodia/Z850W49M1/2015 resulted in the acquisition adamantane drug 
resistance due to the presence of the M2 amino acid substitution S31N. Homotypic 
A(H5N1) clade 2.3.2.1 viruses are generally susceptible to adamantanes as they do 
not carry any of the genetic markers of adamantane resistance. Out of 808 A(H5) 
clade 2.3.2.1 viruses (including subclades 2.3.2.1a-2.3.2.1c) found on the Influenza 
Research Database (https://www.fludb.org), only 5% contained the S31N M2 
mutation [7]. 
 
 
Influenza A(H9N2) is a low pathogenic avian influenza virus that has become 
widespread throughout Asia and Africa since its first appearance in Southern China 
in 1994. Often co-circulating with other subtypes of concern, the A(H9N2) subtype 
has been detected in humans and pigs, so is considered a pandemic threat [2]. In 
addition, A(H9N2) viruses appear to be extremely promiscuous and can easily 
reassort with other influenza viruses, often producing novel strains with increased 
ability to jump the species gap. Prior to the emergence of A(H7N9) in China, 
endemic chicken A(H9N2) viruses provided all of the internal genes through 
numerous reassortment events [8]. Indeed, due to the ongoing co-circulation of 
these viruses, further reassortments between A(H7N9) and A(H9N2) are frequently 
reported [9]. Additionally, influenza A(H9N2) contributed all of the internal genes to 
an A(H10N8) virus that caused a fatal infection in China in 2013 [10]. 
 
 
Interestingly, despite widespread, sustained co-circulation and frequent coinfection 
of influenza A(H5Nx) and A(H9N2), natural reassortants between these viruses are 
seldom detected (Table 1). Similar to the viruses described here from Cambodia, 
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other reassortant viruses with an A(H5N1) backbone and single gene reassortment 
(7:1) with an A(H9N2) MP or PB1 gene have previously been identified in 
Bangladesh [11–13]. There are also reports of A(H5N1) viruses with PB2 genes from 
A(H9N2) from Africa, India and the United Arab Emirates [14–16]. Further, 
reassortant viruses with an A(H9N2) backbone and single gene reassortment with 
A(H5N1) have been described, including: viruses in Pakistan with an A(H5N1) NS 
gene; viruses in Southern China with an A(H5N1) PB1 gene; and viruses in Eastern 
China with an A(H5N1) HA gene [17–19]. 
 
 
There are even fewer reports of multiple gene segment A(H5N1)/A(H9N2) 
reassortant viruses. Phylogenetic studies have revealed that influenza A(H9N2) may 
have provided the internal genes prior to the emergence of A(H5N1) in Hong Kong, 
1997 [20]. More recently, A(H5N2) viruses were detected in chickens from Tibet and 
Vietnam with half of the gene fragments originating from A(H5N1) and the other 
genes from A(H9N2) [21, 22]. There was also a report of an A(H5N2) virus from 
China where all viral genes aside from HA and M clustered with A(H9N2) [23]. 
Evidence of human infection with these reassortant viruses is extremely rare but they 
have been detected previously. In 2013, a Canadian resident died following a 
respiratory illness with meningoencephalitis after recently returning from China. The 
cause of the illness was confirmed to be influenza a clade 2.3.2.1c A(H5N1) 7:1 
reassortant virus with an A(H9N2) PB2 gene [24]. 
 
 
Through active and passive surveillance systems, IPC and NAHPRI have 
documented high levels of avian influenza circulation in Cambodian LBMs, with co- 
circulation of multiple viral subtypes [1, 3, 4]. During the 2015 LBM study 45% 
(342/752) of the poultry samples collected were influenza A positive. High rates of 
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A(H5N1) and A(H9N2) coinfections were also detected in poultry, with both viruses 
identified in 4.5% of chickens and 0.8% of ducks [1]. There is also evidence of 
subclinical human infections with these viruses in Cambodian LBMs, with antibodies 
to A(H5N1) and A(H9N2) detected in 4.5% and 1.8% of poultry workers, respectively 
[4]. High co-circulation of a variety of avian influenza viruses is a risk for the 
emergence of novel reassortant influenza viruses, as was exemplified by a novel 
A(H5N1) clade 1.1.2 virus reassortant that emerged in poultry in Cambodia and 
Vietnam in 2013-2014. This virus contained the HA/NA genes from a clade 1.1.2 
genotype Z virus and the internal and matrix genes from a clade 2.3.2.1a virus [5, 
25]. This novel reassortant caused outbreaks in poultry as well as several human 
cases in both countries. In Cambodia the emergence of this virus was associated 
with a dramatic increase in human cases during 2013 and early 2014 [26]. 
 
 
Little is known about the impact of single A(H9N2) gene (7:1) mutants on the fitness 
or pathogenicity of A(H5) viruses. Further in vitro and in vivo experiments are 
necessary to understand how the contribution of A(H9N2) genes could affect 
A(H5N1) pathogenicity in chickens and if there is an increased risk to human health. 
It is possible that these reassortant viruses may instead have lowered fitness in 
poultry populations and be unable to outcompete currently circulating wildtype 
A(H5N1) viruses, as was suggested for similar reassortant viruses in Bangladesh 
[11]. This lack of fitness is also postulated for these Cambodian strains, as no other 
reassortants have been detected to date since avian influenza surveillance started in 
2011. 
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Conclusions 
 
Overall, the detection of multiple A(H5N1)/A(H9N2) (7:1) viruses exemplifies that 
further surveillance is necessary in Cambodia and other countries with endemic 
circulation of avian influenza viruses. Indeed, continual and vigilant surveillance is 
absolutely crucial in areas endemic for influenza subtypes known to be a public 
health risk, such as A(H5Nx), A(H7Nx) and A(H9N2). In addition, interventions are 
urgently needed to reduce the risk of the emergence of novel avian influenza viruses 
that could constitute a pandemic threat. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Natural influenza A(H5N1) and A(H9N2) reassortant viruses reported in 
the literature 
 
 
Figure 1. Phylogenetic analysis of HA, NA, PB1 and MP genomic segments of 
the Cambodian A(H5N1) reassortant viruses. Trees were constructed using the 
maximum likelihood method based on the general time-reversible model with gamma 
distribution. Branches of H5 and N1 genes trees are presented in red. Branches of 
H9 and N2 genes trees are presented in blue. Branches of PB1 and MP genes are 
colour coded based on the subtype of HA genes, A(H5) viruses are red and A(H9) 
viruses are blue. The taxa of both Cambodian A(H5N1) reassortant strains 
(A/duck/Cambodia/Z564W35M1/2015 and A/chicken/Cambodia/Z850W49M1/2015) 
have been highlighted in red. Scale bars indicate the number of substitutions per site 
and bootstrap values (n=1,000) of 70 or greater are shown. 
 
 
Supplementary Figure 1. Phylogenetic analysis of PB2, PA, NP and NS 
genomic segments of the Cambodian A(H5N1) reassortant viruses. Trees were 
constructed using the maximum likelihood method based on the general time- 
reversible model with gamma distribution. Branches are colour coded based on the 
subtype of HA genes, A(H5) viruses are red and A(H9) viruses are blue. The taxa of 
both Cambodian A(H5N1) reassortant strains (A/duck/Cambodia/Z564W35M1/2015 
and A/chicken/Cambodia/Z850W49M1/2015) have been highlighted in red. Scale 
bars indicate the number of substitutions per site and bootstrap values (n=1,000) of 
70 or greater are shown. 
